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M ORATORY legislation of some type or other has
been passed during, or after, most economic de-
pressions from the time of the Romans to the present
day.2 It is but natural that some efforts should be taken
for the relief of hard-pressed debtors who, without out-
side aid and protection, would fare ill in the apparently
inevitable process of forced liquidation of debts. The
consequent scarcity of funds during such times leads to
increasing numbers of foreclosures and forced sales of
mortgaged property. Market values of property are
thereby further depressed, and the defaulting debtor not
only loses the security which he has pledged but also finds
himself saddled with a deficiency judgment. This situa-
tion may be aggravated when it is accompanied, as it was
from 1929' to 1933, by an increase in the relative value,
or purchasing power, of the dollar with which the debtor
is obligated to pay back his debt. "And so long as this
process of liquidation continues uncontrolled and unregu-
lated, the more depressed the market for real estate must
become, followed in turn by still more foreclosures and
still further depressed prices. Both courts and legisla-
tures have, in these circumstances, been alert to discover
means of relieving mortgage debtors. ' 3
* The writer's initial interest in this problem was stimulated by a seminar on
"Constitutional Problems of the Depression," given by Mr. Charles Bunn in
the University of Chicago during the summer quarter of 1933. See his article
on "The Impairment of Contracts," I University of Chicago Law Review 249
(1933).
The writer should further indicate his indebtedness to Andrew C. McLaugh-
lin, professor emeritus of American history in the University of Chicago, fox
advice and suggestions.
1 Alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 See Feller, "Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study," 46 Harvard L.
Rev. 1061, 1062-65.
3 "Recent Legislation for the Relief of Mortgage Debtors," 42 Yale L. Jour.
1236.
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At least twenty-five state legislatures have responded
to the needs of the past few years4 by enacting moratory
laws which extend periods of redemption,5 provide for
4 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. This list may
not be exclusive.
Cases discussing constitutionality of these statutes:
Arkansas: Provision abolishing deficiency judgments held unconstitutional in
Adams v. Spillyards, 61 S. W. (2d) 686 (1933) ; while provision extending time
for answers in foreclosure suits from 20 days to three months held constitu-
tional in Reiman v. Rawls, 68 S. W. (2d) 470 (Ark. 1934).
Michigan: Provision extending period of redemption with compensation held
constitutional in Russell v. Battle Creek Lumber Co., 252 N. W. 561 (Mich.,
1934).
Minnesota: Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934).
New Jersey: Provision substituting fair market value for proceeds of fore-
closure sale held unconstitutional in Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. J.
L. 596, 169 Ad. 177 (1933).
New York: Provision extending redemption period with compensation held
constitutional in Sherwin v. Jonas, 267 N. Y. S. 759 (1933) ; and provision for-
bidding foreclosure solely for nonpayment of principal held constitutional in
McCarty v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 266 N. Y. S. 629 (1933).
North Dakota: Provision extending redemption period without compensation
held inapplicable (unconstitutional) to existing mortgages in State ex rel.
Cleveringa v. Klein, 249 N. W. 118 (1933).
Oklahoma: Provision staying foreclosure actions held unconstitutional (under
state constitution) in Oklahoma ex rel. Osage County Say. & Loan Bank v.
Worten, 29 Pac. (2d) 1 (1933); but in an unreported decision, Oklahoma ex
rel. Roth v. Waterfield, U. S. Law Week, Oct. 24, 1933, at p. 8, the provision
extending redemption with compensation was upheld by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma.
South Dakota: Provision restricting sale by advertisement held constitutional
in Northwest Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court, 249 N. W. 631 (1933).
Texas: Provision extending redemption period with compensation held un-
constitutional in State ex rel. Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Sanders, 62 S. W. (2d)
348, (El Passo, 1933) and in Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W. (2d) 404, (San
Antonio, 1933) ; but same provision held constitutional in Lingo Lumber Co.
v. Hayes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835 (Dallas, 1933), Beaumont Petroleum Syndicate v.
Broussard, 64 S. W. (2d) 993 (Beaumont, 1933), and in Anthony v. North
Am. Bldg. & Loan Assn., 68 S. W. (2d) 581 (Dallas, 1934). These are all
decisions by coordinate branches of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
In State ex rel. Lichtscheidl v. Moeller, Minn. , 249 N. W. 330 (1933),
sheriff's adjournment of mortgage foreclosure sales under invalid executive
order of governor held validated by curative provision of statute authorizing
such adjournment for not exceeding ninety days. But in Alliance Trust Co.
v. Hall, 5 F. Supp. 285 (1933) proclamations of governor of Idaho suspend-
ing foreclosures for sixty-day period, issued by virtue of act empowering gov-
ernor to declare legal holidays, in emergencies, during which enforcement of
judicial process is restricted.
5 Blanket extension: Kansas (c. 232); North Dakota (c. 157); and South
Dakota (c. 137).
Discretionary extension: Minnesota (c. 339, Pt. I, §4); Iowa (c. 179); New
Hampshire (c. 161, §§9-11); and Vermont (no. 30, §3).
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dilatory pleadings, 6 restrain or suspend proceed-
ings,7 order continuances, delay trial or judgment, 9 post-
pone sales,10 direct courts to fix upset prices in advance
of sale" or to refuse confirmation where a fair price was
not bid, 2 deduct the fair value of mortgaged property
from the deficiency judgment, 8 and curtail or abol-
ish deficiency judgments. 4 These statutes vary widely
within each of the nine groups. Their ultimate constitu-
tionality will depend upon a nice weighing of the factors
involved in the changed relations of creditor and debtor:
Have they been altered in a reasonable exercise of the
state's police power? That is the test laid down in Home
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell.6
In that case the plaintiffs owned real estate in Minne-
apolis mortgaged to the defendant, which had been fore-
closed and purchased at the sheriff's sale by the defend-
ant. The reasonable value of the property was alleged
to be greatly in excess of the amount of the mortgage
6 Arkansas (c. 29); Oklahoma (c. 56, §1); and North Dakota (c. 99, §1).
Such provisions have been sustained in Holloway v. Sherman, 12 Iowa 282
(1861) and in Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559 (1859).
7 Restraining proceedings: Montana (c. 116) and Ohio (227-8). Suspending
proceedings: Illinois (649-50) and New York (c. 793).
8 Arizona (c. 29); Iowa (c. 182); Michigan (no. 98); Oklahoma (c. 56,
§§2 & 3); and Texas (c. 102).
9 North Dakota (c. 99) and Oklahoma (c. 56, § 1).
10 Blanket postponement: California (cc. 30, 263, 1057) and Texas (cc. 17,
59, 105).
Discretionary postponement: Arkansas (no. 21, §3) ; Minnesota (c. 339, Pt.
I, §2); Nebraska (c. 65); New Hampshire (c. 161, §§3-8); North Carolina
(c. 275, §1); Ohio (227-8); Pennsylvania (no. 137); and Wisconsin (cc. II,
125).
11 Kansas (c. 218) ; Michigan (c. 229) ; North Carolina (c. 275, §2); West
Virginia (c. 34); and Wisconsin (c. 13).
12 Arkansas (no. 21, §4; no. 57, §§3-4) ; Kansas (c. 218); Minnesota (c. 339,
Pt. I. §3); Nebraska (c. 45); New York (c. 275, §§1-2); and West Virginia
(c. 34).
18 California (cc. 642, 793); Idaho (c. 150); Kansas (c. 218); Nebraska
(c. 45); New Jersey (c. 82) ; New York (c. 794); North Carolina (c. 275, §3)
South Carolina (no. 264) ; and Texas (c. 92).
14Curtailing deficiency judgments: Arizona (c. 88); California (c. 790);
North Carolina (c. 529); New Jersey (c. 82) ; and Texas (c. 92). Abolishing
deficiency judgments: Arkansas (no. 57, §§ 1-2) ; Nebraska (c. 41) ; North
Dakota (c. 155).
15 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 255 (1934).
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debt. Because of the economic depression, the plaintiffs
had been unable to obtain a new loan or redeem and, they
asserted, unless the period of redemption was extended,
the property would be irretrievably lost.16 A judgment
was entered extending the period of redemption to May
1, 1935, (approximately two years), subject to the pay-
ment of forty dollars a month throughout the period by
the plaintiffs, as authorized by the recently enacted Min-
nesota Mortgage Moratorium Law.'7 The judgment was
affirmed by the state supreme court.' An appeal was
taken to the United States Supreme Court, contesting
the validity of the statute on the basis of the contract,
due process, and equal protection clauses of the Federal
Constitution.'
Chief Justice Hughes, who rendered the opinion for
the court (with Sutherland delivering a dissenting opin-
ion in, which Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler
concurred), concluded:
1. An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a
proper occasion for the exercise of the reserved power of the
State to protect the vital interests of the community....
2. The legislation was addressed to a legitimate end, that is,
the legislation was not for the mere advantage of particular in-
dividuals but for the protection of a basic interest of society.
3. In view of the nature of the contracts in question-mort-
gages of unquestionable validity-the relief afforded and justi-
fied by the emergency, in order not to contravene the constitu-
tional provision, could only be of a character appropriate to that
emergency and could be granted only upon reasonable conditions.
4. The conditions upon which the period of redemption is
extended do not appear to be unreasonable .... thus providing
a procedure and relief which are cognate to the historic exercise
of the equitable jurisdiction ....
16 Granting of motion to dismiss reversed in Blaisdell v. Home Building &
Loan Ass'n, 189 Minn. 422, 249 N. W. 334, 86 A. L. R. 1507 (1933).
17 Ch. 339, Laws of 1933, p. 514.
Is 189 Minn. 448, 249 N. W. 893 (1933).
'9 Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231,
78 L. Ed. 255 (1934).
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5. The legislation is temporary in operation.20
The decision in the Blaisdell case did not sustain the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law in its entirety, for
the provisions 21 abolishing foreclosure by advertisement
and deficiency judgments were not involved in the facts of
the decision. It merely settled the constitutionality of
the provision authorizing the extension of the period of
redemption on reasonable conditions, including payment
of the fair rental value.22 It does not validate any type
of moratory legislation but rather indicates the tests to
which such legislation will be subjected if it is to pass
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court.23 It can confidently
be asserted that many provisions of the statutes listed
fall far short of this test, as will be pointed out later.
The language of the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution reads absolute in form: "No State shall ...
pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts. "2
Perhaps it was so intended in fact by the framers of the
Constitution: that, at least, has been one of the common
suppositions of constitutional law until recently. The
historical background upon which the prohibition was
written was rather summarily dismissed by the Chief
Justice in the Blaisdell case. While approving the fa-
mous passage from Ogden v. Saunders,25 which discusses
the occasion and purpose of the contract clause, he force-
fully insisted that
20 Ibid., 54 S. Ct. 242-3.
21 Ch. 339, Pt. I, §§2-3, 5.
22 "The mortgagee-purchaser during the time that he cannot obtain posses-
sion thus is not left without compensation for the withholding of possession.
Also important is the fact that mortgagees, as is shown by official reports of
which we may take notice, are predominantly corporations, such as insurance
companies, banks, and investment and mortgage companies. These, and such
individual mortgagees as are small investors, are not seeking homes or the
opportunity to engage in farming. Their chief concern is the reasonable
protection of their investment security." 54 S. Ct. 243.
23 See comprehensive note in 18 Minn. L. Rev. 319, 340-41 (1934).
24 United States Constitution, Article I, section 10. The full section reads,
"No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters
of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but
gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any
title of nobility."
25 12 Wheat. 213 (1827).
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It is no answer to say that this public need was not appre-
hended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision of the
Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the
vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Constitu-
tion meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it is in-
tended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be
confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the con-
ditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them,
the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against
such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered
the memorable warning-" We must never forget that it is a con-
stitution we are expounding" (McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 407, 4 L. Ed. 579, 601)---"a constitution intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs. "26
A fundamentally different approach is revealed in Mr.
Justice Sutherland's dissent, for to him
A candid consideration of the history and circumstances which
led up to and accompanied the framing and adoption of this
clause will demonstrate conclusively that it was framed and
adopted with the specific and studied purpose of preventing legis-
lation designed to relieve debtors especially in time of financial
distress .... With due regard for the processes of logical think-
ing, it legitimately cannot be urged that conditions which pro-
duced the rule may now be-invoked to destroy it.27
Although Mr. Justice Sutherland may admit that the
provisions of the constitution are pliable "in a sense,"
yet "their meaning is changeless; it is only their appli-
cation that is extensible."
28
The meaning of the contract clause may be clarified
by a consideration of the conditions out of which the
constitutional document sprang. It was John Fiske, abler
as a fascinating writer than as a cautious and accurate
historian, who left the permanent characterization of the
period preceding the adoption of the Federal Constitu-
26 S4 S. Ct. 242.
27 54 S. Ct. 245-46, 252.
28 54 S. Ct. 245.
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tion "The Critical Period in American History." And
that is, the picture which the other great writers have
conventionally drawn-Marshall, Fisher Ames, Bancroft,
McMaster, Curtis-all, it must be noted, of a definitely
Federalist turn in politics. Flaringly conspicuous to
their' historical eye stand Shay's Rebellion, wild-cat
paper currency, jealous interferences. with the normal
course of trade and commerce and stay laws,. Marshall's
forceful language in Ogden v. Saunders,29 described the
situation.
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and cred-
itor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home
to every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the con-
duct of every individual in those things which he supposes to be
proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to such
an excess by the state legislatures, as to break in upon the or-
dinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between
man and man. The mischief had become so great, so alarming, as
not only to ;impair commercial intercourse, and threaten the ex-
istenee of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy
the, sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance
of the evil-was an object of deep interest with all the truly wise,
as well as-the virtuous of this great community, and was one of
the important benefits expected from a reform of the government.
One of the great objectives in calling the constitutional
convention in 1787 was to place various types of re-
straints on state governments in the furtherance of the
common cause of national solidarity. The document that
resulted, indicating the decided reaction from the "ex-
cesses of democracy" of the revolutionary period, can
be clearly contrasted with the Declaration of Indepen-
dence of a decade earlier: "Property" had been sub-
stituted for "happiness," as the guarantee which was
the primary objective of government.
The Connecticut Plan, urged by Sherman and Ells-
worth, which aided materially in breaking the great
deadlock between the large and small states over state
29 12 Wheat. 213 (1827). The famous passage is from pp. 354-55.
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representation in the national legislature, contained a
provision forbidding the state legislatures "in any man-
ner to obstruct or impede the recovery of debts, whereby
the interests of foreigners or the citizens of any other
state may be affected.' '
°
Contemporaneously with the discussions in Philadel-
phia, the Congress in New York passed the famous
Northwest Ordinance, on July 13, which, in the conclud-
ing section of Article II, provided that "in the just pres-
ervation, of rights and property, it is understood and
'declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force
in the said territory, that shall, in any manner what-
ever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or
engagements, bona fide, and without fraud previously
formed. "3 About a month later, on August 28, Rufus
King, of the Massachusetts delegation, moved in the con-
vention that this provision from the Northwest Ordi-
nance be inserted into the Federal Constitution.
3 2
Colonel Mason, who had drafted the Virginia State Con-
stitution and was a member of the delegation from that
state, vigorously opposed it; for he thought that cases
would happen that could not be foreseen where some kind
of interference would be "proper and essential. "3 Gouv-
erneur Morris, Pennsylvania, and Luther Martin, Mary-
land, who was a vigorous dissenter from the Constitution
as finally adopted, likewise opposed it.34 Morris-, how-
ever, significantly said, "The judicial power of the United
States will be protection of cases within their jurisdic-
tion," thus implying that such legislation would be
invalid even without an express restriction in the Con-
stitution. But as Warren in his Making of the Constitu-
tion concludes, "There was also a genuine belief by some
30 Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United
States, I, 241.
31 MacDonald, Documentary Source-Book of American History, 1606-1926,
pp. 210-16, 214.
32 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, II, p. 439. See also War-
ren, Making of the Constitution, p. 552.
3 3 Farrand, ibid., II, 440.
84 Warren, ibid., p. 554.
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delegates that, under some circumstances and in financial
crises, such stay and tender laws might be necessary to
avert calamitous loss to debtors. ' ' 3 Luther Martin, for
instance, wrote in his letter to the Maryland legislature
that he
considered that there might be times of such great public calam-
ity and distress and of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should
render it the duty of a Government for the preservation of even
the most valuable part of its citizens, in some measures to inter-
fere in their favor, by passing laws totally or practically stopping
Courts of Justice or authorizing the debtor to pay by installment
or by delivering up his property to his creditors at a reasonable
and honest valuation. The times have been such as to render
regulations of this kind necessary in most or all of the States, to
prevent the wealthy creditor and the moneyed man from totally
destroying the poor though industrious debtor. Such times may
again arrive.3 6
Randolph, head of the Virginia delegation, on the other
hand, considered this provision essential when he spoke
in the Virginia state convention,
because it must be promotive of virtue and justice and preven-
tive of injustice and fraud. If we take a review of the calamities
which have befallen our reputations as a people, we shall find
they have been produced by frequent interferences of the State
Legislatures with private contracts. If you inspect the great
cornerstones of republicanism, you will find it to be justice and
honor.3
7
Rufus King's motion on August 28 was lost, however.
The convention, by a vote of seven against three states,"8
adopted the motion of Rutledge, of South Carolina, that
the states be forbidden to pass "ex post facto laws,"
according to the Journal, or "retrospective laws," ac-
8 5 p. 554.
86 Elliot, Debates, 1, 376.
37 Ibid., III, 478-79.
38 Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Penn-
sylvania, and Virginia (Randolph's argument did not sway the Virginia dele-
gation), against Georgia, North, and South Carolina.
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cording to Madison's Notes. 9 It would seem on this
conflict of sources that the Joitrnal is correct, for on the
following day John Dickinson, Delaware, "mentioned to
the House that, on examining Blackstone's Commentaries
he found that the term ex post facto related to criminal
cases only; that they would not consequently restrain
the states from retrospective laws in civil cases; and
that some further provision for the purpose would be
requisite. ',0
When the Committee on Style, of which Rufus King
was a member, reported its draft to the convention on
September 12, it had added a prohibition against "laws
altering or impairing the obligation of contracts." On
September 14, the wording of this section was redrafted
to omit the word "altering," and to confine the clause to
"impairing the obligation of contracts." This was during
the last days of the convention, and the report of the
committee- with the indicated change-was accepted
without question, although King's motion in open con-
vention had previously been rejected.41 Thus it is seen
that the records of the convention do not clearly show
that the contract clause was adopted after deliberate con-
sideration. From this, one obtains the impression that the
Committee on Style played a much more active part than
its directions warranted it in doing.
Probably the first state statute attacked under the
contract clause was the one held unconstitutional in June,
1792, in the unreported case of Alexander Champion and
Thomas Dickason v. Silas Casey.
The statute involved was an Act of the Rhode Island General
Assembly passed in February, 1791, in response to a petition of
a debtor for an extension of three years' time in which to settle
his accounts with his creditors and for an exemption from all
arrests and attachments for such term of three years. The de-
89 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, II, pp. 435, 440. See
also Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States, p. 154.
40 Warren, Making of the Constitution, pp. 355-6.
41 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, II, 566-97, 610. See also
Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution, p. 188.
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cision was as follows: "The Court also determined in the case
of Champion and Dickason against Silas Casey that the Legis-
lature of a state has no right to make a law to exempt an indi-
vidual from arrests and his estate from attachments for his pri-
vate debts, for any term of time, it being clearly a law impairing
the obligation of contracts, and therefore contrary to the Consti-
tution of the United States." Another newspaper stated that:
"The defendant's counsel pleaded a resolution of the state in bar
of the action, by which he was allowed three years to pay his
debts and during which he was to be free from arrests on the ac-
count. The Judges were unanimously of the opinion that, as by
the Constitution of the United States, the individual states are
prohibited from making laws which shall impair the obligation of
contracts, and as the resolution in question, if operative, would
impair the obligation of the contract in question, therefore it
could not be admitted to bar the action.
42
A distinction was early taken between a statute chang-
ing the remedy and one changing substantial rights under
the contract-the obligation. The one was sustained and
the other was stricken down as running afoul of the con-
stitutional prohibition by Chief Justice Marshall in the
famous case of Sturges v. Crowinshield,43 where he said:
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the
remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has
been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things. With-
out impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may
certainly be modified as the wisdom of the nation shall direct.
While this dictum of the celebrated Chief Justice has
been followed in a number of cases, 44 it is clear that the
legislature cannot, under the guise of altering the rem-
edy, effectually change the relative positions of the
parties to the contract and thus affect substantial rights.
42 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, I, 66-68.
43 4 Wheat. 122 (1819). The passage is from p. 200.
44 Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714 (1880), where abolition of imprisonment
for debt was held not to impair the obligation; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S.
769 (1882) ; Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51 (1882);
Waggoner v. Flack, 188 U. S. 595 (1903); Funkhouser v. J. B. Preston Co.,
78 L. Ed. 125 (1933) ; and cases cited in note 13of Hughes' opinion, 54 S. Ct.
238.
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The courts realize that the concepts of right, or obliga-
tion, and remedy are not in two distinct categories but
are functionally dependent. It is impossible to conceive
of a legal right without a corresponding legal remedy
available for the enforcement of such a legal right. A
right without a corresponding remedy is by definition
excluded from legal theory. This point was clearly dis-
cussed in the case of von Hoffman v. City of Quincy,45
from which the following excerpts are quoted:
It is also settled that the laws which subsist at the time and
place of the making of a contract, and where it is to be per-
formed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were ex-
pressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This principle
embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, dis-
charge, and enforcement .... Nothing can be more material to
the obligation than the means of enforcement .... The ideas of
validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the
obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against in-
vasion .... It is competent for the states to .change the form of
the remedy, or to modify otherwise, as they may see fit, provided
no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby* impaired.
No attempt has been made to fix definitely the. line between al-
terations of the remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, and
those which under the form of modifying the remedy, impair
substantial rights. Every case must be determined upon its own
circumstances.
46
Bronson v. Kinzie47 at the time of its decision was
without question the leading case on the constitutionality
of a redemption statute applicable to mortgages. In
1841, following the depression of the late thirties, Illinois
passed a statute providing that the equitable estate of the
mortgagor should not be extinguished until twelve
months after sale and that no sale should be confirmed
unless two-thirds of the amount at which the property
had been valued by appraisers was bid. Taney, in invali-
dating the statute, said:
45 4 Wall. 535, 550 (1866).
46 4 Wall. 550-54.
47 1 How. 311 (1843).
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But it is manifest that the obligation of the contract, and the
rights of the party under it, may, in effect, be destroyed by
denying a remedy altogether; or may be seriously impaired by
burdening the proceedings with new conditions and restrictions,
so as to make the remedy hardly worth pursuing.
The decision in Bronson v. Kinzie came coincidentally
with the repeal of the national bankruptcy laws, aroused
the greatest degree of antagonism in the Middle West,
occasioned riots, and caused the State's representative in
the United States Senate to introduce a resolution pro-
posing a constitutional amendment prohibiting judicial
review.
4 8
Shortly after the Bronson decision, Illinois passed, for
the relief of poor debtors, another statute providing that
no sale should be made of property levied on under exe-
cution unless it would bring in two-thirds of its valuation
as determined by the opinions of three householders. But
this statute fell before the constitutional prohibition in
McCracken v. Hayward,49 where the court reviewed in
detail the preceding case and confirmed the views an-
nounced therein.
If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty, or impair the
right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract, in
favor of one party, to the injury of the other; hence any law,
which in its operation amounts to a denial or obstruction of the
rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on
the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Con-
stitution.
These views were confirmed, with not any significant
variation, in Howard v. Bugbee, 0 Walker v. Whitehead,5
and Barnitz v. Beverley.
52
48 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, II, 376-78.
492 How. 608, 612 (1844). See also Gentley v. Ewing, 3 How. 707 (184).
5024 How. 461 (1860).
51 16 Wall. 314 (1872).
52 163 U. S. 118 (1896). Note that the Kansas Supreme Court was "packed."
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Daniels v. Tearney5 seems the only decision in which
the United States Supreme Court has actually passed on
the validity of a stay law, although dicta invalidating
such legislation are numerous.54 In 1861, the Virginia
Convention in declaring its secession passed an ordinance
staying all executions "until otherwise provided by
law," and authorizing the issuance of bonds in their
stead. The constitutionality of this legislation was raised
in that case through the plea of the defendant to the suit
on such a bond. The court held the bond wholly void as
predicated upon the statute but sustained the action on
the theory of estoppel. The value of this case as a pre-
cedent is thus somewhat diminished and, further so, when
one recognizes how strongly colored the decision was by
the theory of the rebellion, for the ordinance was in
furtherance of the secession.
Statutes applying new exemptions to existing obliga-
tions have likewise fared ill in the United States Supreme
Court. In Edwards v. Kearzey, 5 a homestead exemption
contained in the North Carolina Constitution was con-
strued inapplicable (i. e., unconstitutional) to existing
types of indebtedness. The same view was announced in
Bank of Minden v. Clement,56 where a Louisiana statute
exempting proceeds of life insurance policies from the
claims of creditors was invalidated, although such an
exemption had become an almost universal type. It might
be noted that this latter decision was announced just one
week before the famous rent cases and is contained in
the same volume of the reports. The Edwards case is of
particular interest today for a very vigorous defense was
63 102 U. S. 415 (1880). Stay laws were held unconstitutional by state
courts in Phinney v. Phinney, 8; Me. 450, 17 Atd. 405 (1889); Barnes v.
Barnes, 8 Jones 280 (N. C., 1861); Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 244 (Va.,
1868); Swinburne v. Mills, 17 Wash. 611, 50 Pac. 489 (1897). But stay laws
were sustained in. ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77 (1866) ; and Chadwick v. Moore,
8 W. & S. 49 (Penn., 1844).
54 See dicta in Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 601 (1877); Louisiana
v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 207 (1880); Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284,
297-98 (1887); Oshkosh Waterworks v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 439, 443-44
(1903). And see Fuller, 46 Harvard L. Rev. 1061, 1070-72.
55 96 U. S. 595 (1877).
56256 U. S. 126 (1921).
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there attempted on the ground of what could be called
the police power. But this approach to problems of
constitutional law was subjected to a thorough-going
denunciation.
No community can have any higher public interest than in the
faithful performance of contracts and the honest administration
of justice .... "Policy and humanity" are ... dangerous guides
in the discussion of a legal proposition. He who follows them
far is apt to bring back the means of error and delusion. The
prohibition contains no qualification, and we have no judicial au-
thority to interpolate any. Our duty is simply to execute it. 57
(Mr. Justice Sutherland, quoting the foregoing passage in his
dissent in the Blaisdell case, took such comfort in this quotation
that he added the italics here indicated.)
The same point of view was stated in Ex parte Mil-
1igan,58 where the court laid down the dictum that
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious conse-
quences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigen-
cies of government.
Like most general utterances, this statement is neither
wholly true nor even a solemn decision of the court.
Ex parte Milligan did not decide that a government in
time of war could not proceed by military commissions;
it merely decided that such a military commission could
not sentence a man to death without a jury trial where,
for all that appeared, the ordinary courts of justice were
functioning satisfactorily (namely, in Indiana). But that
has been steadily forgotten to the favor of the preceding
quotation. This absolutist spirit, while it may issue in
some satisfaction through an imaginative solution of the
ceaseless "quest for certainty," crumbles completely to
57 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 603.
5s4 Wall. 2, 120 (1866).
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the ground when applied to the facts of reality. As
Holmes has so clearly seen:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical
extreme. Yet all in fact are limited by the neighborhood of prin-
ciples of policy which are other than those on which the par-
ticulai right is founded, and which become strong enough to
hold their own when a certain point is reached. The limits set
to property by other public interests present themselves as a
branch of what is called the police power of the state. The bound-
ary at which the conflicting interests balance cannot be deter-
mined by any general formula in advance, but points in the line,
or helping to establish it, are fixed by decisions that this or that
concrete case falls on the nearer or farther side.59
The doctrine of the police power of the state is not a
recent development in constitutional law. It was exer-
cised extensively during the time of the Tudors in Eng-
land. Patrick Henry, rebellious patriot who with the
mellowing of the years turned conservative, spoke repeat-
edly on the "internal police." And Chief Justice
Marshall frequently had occasion to use the very term,
"police power. "6° But it is since the turn of the cen-
tury-although in Mwn' v. Illinois61 in 1876 it had been
stated in its essence-that police power has become a
very real concept.
It is a familiar dictum that the state cannot bargain
away the police power. By making a contract about the
given subject-matter the state has not in any way
incapacitated itself from regulating what otherwise would
621be within its admitted power. Justice Pitney summed
up the decision in 1915 thus:
59 In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355 (1907). At
page 357 of the same opinion Holmes said, "One whose rights, such as they
are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of
the state by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the
infirmity of the subject-matter."
60 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827).
61 94 U. S. 113 (1876). For the classic treatise on the subject, see Freund,
Police Power (1904).
62 This does not seem to be true in cases of tax exemptions. New Jersey v.
Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (1812); Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430
(1869). Nor in some cases of public utility rates. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558 (1900). But see the cases cited in footnote 66,
intra.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
It is established by repeated decisions of this court that neither
of these provisions [contract and due process clauses] of the Fed-
eral Constitution has the effect of overriding the power of the
state to establish all regulations reasonably necessary to secure
the health, safety, or general welfare of the community; that
this power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is
inalienable even by express grant; and that all contract and
property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.63
Liquor prohibition laws, although nullifying brewing
contracts, have repeatedly been sustained."4 Anti-lottery
laws have been sustained even over the objection of a
corporation specially chartered to carry on such lotteries
only a short time before the passage of the law.65 In
Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park,66 an ordinance for-
bidding the transportation of dead animals within the
village limits was sustained, although its enforcement
spelled the complete cessation of the fertilizing plant
specially chartered to carry on that type of business in
the very locality concerned.
6 7
In Manigaidt v. Springs, 8 the court sustained a South
Carolina statute authorizing Springs to erect a dam
across a creek where the parties had previously con-
tracted that the creek should run free of any obstruction.
Mr. Justice Brown, in rendering the opinion of the court,
made a statement pregnant with implications:
It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of sta-
tutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the
63 Chicago & Alton Rd. v. Tranborger, 238 U. S. 67, 76-77.
64 Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25 (1877).
65 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1879). But just what does "lotteries
disturb the checks and balances of a well-ordered community" mean?
60 97 U. S. 659 (1878).
67 For other cases in the field of public utility law see Knoxville Water Co.
v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434 (1903) where a municipal ordinance reducing water
rates was sustained as not impairing contracts between the water company and
private consumers. In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349
(1907) a New Jersey law was sustained which forbade the transportation of
water outside the state, although it may have affected contracts to furnish water
to persons outside the state. But cf. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water
Co., 172 U. S. 1 (1898), and Detroit v. Detroit Citizens Street Ry. Co., 184
U. S. 368 (1902).
68 199 U. S. 473 (1905). The passage is quoted from p. 480.
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state from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the pro-
motion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good
of the public, though contracts previously entered into between
individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which, in its
various ramifications, is known as the police power, is an exercise
of the sovereign right of the government to protect the lives,
health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people, and
is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.
It was in the wartime rent cases, however, that the
police power triumphed over the contract clause to the
extent of "the verge of the law," as it then existed.
With the rapidly growing complexity and numbers of
governmental agencies necessitated by war conditions,
the housing situation in the Capital became so acute that
Congress passed a special act setting up a rent com-
mission to fix reasonable rentals and to authorize, upon
the payment thereof, tenants to hold over upon the
expiration of their leases, although the contract of letting
contained the universal clause of surrender. The District
of Columbia Act was sustained against an attack on the
ground of the Fifth Amendment in Block v. Hirsch69 as
an emergency measure, for, as Justice Holmes said, "a
limit in time, to tide over a passing trouble, well may jus-
tify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent
change." A similar statute was enacted in New York
where housing conditions in the metropolis were equally
acute. When it was promptly attacked under the due
process and contract clauses, it was sustained in Marcus
Brown Holding Company v. FeldmO7 ° in a very short
opinion by Justice Holmes, who thought that
The chief objections to these acts have been dealt with in
Block v. Hirsch .... In the present case more emphasis is laid
upon the impairment of the obligation of the contract of the
lessees to surrender possession, and of the new lease, which was to
69256 U. S. 135 (1921). In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543
(1924) the District of Columbia Act was held inoperative after the emergency
had ceased, ignoring a declaration of Congress to the contrary. "If about all
that remains of war conditions is the increased cost of living, that is not in
itself a justification of the act." Holmes, J., at p. 548.
70256 U. S. 170, 198 (1921).
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have gone into effect upon October 1, last year. But contracts
are made subject to this exercise of the power of the State when
otherwise justified, as we have held this to be.
The same New York statute was reconsidered in Levy
Leasing Company v. Siegel,71 and the view taken in the
Marcus Brown case was confirmed. Mr. Justice Clarke,
delivering the opinion for the court, said:
That such an emergency, if it really existed, would sustain a
resort, otherwise valid, to the police power for the purpose of
dealing with it, cannot be doubted, for, unless relieved, the
public welfare would suffer in respects which constitute the
primary and undisputed, as well as the most usual, basis and jus-
tification for exercise of that power.
The value of these cases as precedents was somewhat
disparaged when the Justice who gave the opinion in
both the District of Columbia and the New York rent
cases specifically referred to them as "going to the verge
of the law," refusing to apply them in Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon
2
Government could hardly go on if, to some extent, values in-
cident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are
gone....
The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking. ...
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change. As we have already said, this is a question of de-
gree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general proposi-
71258 U. S. 242, 245 (1922).
72 260 U. S. 393, 413, 415-16 (1922).
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tions. But we regard this as going beyond any of the cases de-
cided by this court. The late decisions upon laws dealing with
the congestion of Washington and New York, caused by the war,
dealt with laws intended to meet a temporary emergency, and
providing for compensation determined to be reasonable by an
impartial board. They went to the verge of the law, but fell
far short of the present act.
The relation of crises or emergencies to the exercise
of governmental power had been discussed by the
Supreme Court a few years earlier in sustaining the
Adamson Act in Wilson v. New, 7 3 where Chief Justice
White, whose opinions had usually tended toward a con-
servative interpretation, reasoned:
Nor is it an answer ... to suggest that the situation was one of
emergency, and that emergency cannot be made the source of
power [citing Ex parte Milligan.] The proposition begs the ques-
tion, since although an emergency may not call into life a power
which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a rea-
son for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed.
Chief Justice White sustained the temporary fixing of
hours of work and rates of wages for interstate railway
employees, matters which had run afoul of constitutional
prohibitions in numerous cases. 74 And this same reason-
ing was adopted by Chief Justice Hughes in the Blaisdell
case.
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not in-
crease granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions im-
posed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to
the Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the
States were determined in the light of emergency, and they
are not altered by emergency....
While emergency does not create power, emergency may fur-
nish the occasion for the exercise of power [citing Wilson v.
73 243 U. S. 332, 348 (1917).
74 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908), and Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
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New]. . . The constitutional question presented in the light
of an emergency is whether the power possessed embraces the
particular exercise of it in response to particular conditions. 75
But the opinion ends, "The judgment of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota is affirmed," although one is left
with the distinct impression that but for this emergency,
it would have been "reversed." Justice Sutherland has
just grounds for complaining that "this, as it seems to
me, is merely to say the same thing by the use of another
set of words, with the effect of affirming that which has
just been denied."
7 6
Emergency was urged in constitutional argument in a
series of early cases, not easily accessible today, dealing
with similar problems which arose from strained foreign
relations during the Napoleonic wars in Europe. None
of these cases reached the United States Supreme Court,
which, it should be noted, had less prestige than some
of the state courts ;77 but those decided by the state courts
determined the immediate case, either giving the debtor
relief in some very interesting opinions or denying it
with a pretended shock of conscience.
During the Jeffersonian embargo of 1807, several of
the southern states, notably Virginia and Georgia,
adopted various types of stay laws. They were designed
to ameliorate some of the devastating effects of a rigor-
ous enforcement of the embargo by postponing execu-
tions on judgments until six months after its repeal. The
validity of the Virginia statute was contested in the
Federal circuit court before Chief Justice Marshall, who,
without directly passing on the constitutionality of the
Virginia law, neutralized its effect in aiding the embargo
by holding it not controlling of processes issuing out of
the Federal courts.
7 8
75 54 S. Ct. 235.
76 54 S. Ct. 252.
77 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, I, introductory
chapters.
78 Ibid., I, pp. 353-55.
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To the southern states, whose income so largely de-
pended upon the export trade, the emergency created by
the embargo was very real. This is apparent in two
decisions of the Georgia Superior Court. In Ex parte
Paul Grimbal,79 a debtor filed a bill in equity stating that
executions had been taken out against his property, a
levy and sale menaced, and that "if a sale is made by the
sheriff, at this time, when the pecuniary embarrassments
occasioned by the embargo acts are so general and dis-
tressing, it will involve him in ruin, as no price, or no
fair price, can be obtained for his property, and that he
has no other means of paying his debts." Judge Charl-
ton in issuing an injunction said:
I shall not bottom a decision, or as a particular case, involving
such features of hardships and oppression, as render necessary
the interposition of this branch of the Court. On the contrary, I
shall view this as a case in which all our citizens are interested,
and as calculated to establish a precedent for the general bene-
fit. I ask the question; is it not against equity and conscience?
is it not in the highest degree oppressive, to compel the sheriff to
obey the mandate of a writ of execution, when the facts are be-
-fore the whole public, that the sale of produce, in its usual course
of traffic is suspended, or bought up by monied men, from the
necessitous planter for a song?
It has been, and is at this hour, a subject of sufficient magni-
tude, to require one of the extraordinary meetings of the legis-
lature which the constitution authorizes. But, until a legislative
suspension of sales is given to the people, cannot relief be af-
forded by this court? . . . A lord chancellor of Great Britain is
almost as omnipotent as parliament. Give him but a strong hold
on an equitable principle, and he will be sure to substitute the
intention of an act of parliament for its letter; he will push aside
precedent for abstract honesty .... I shall, therefore, bottom my
decision upon the abstract grounds; that cases of this description
involve hardship and oppression; that they are against equity
and conscience; that they are promotive of injury to the pub-
79Hall's American Law Journal, I, 183 (1808). See also the American
Daily Advertiser, for June 18, 1808.
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lie; that they enable monied men to accumulated usurious wealth;
and that they tend to convert a just and salutary measure of
the Government into an engine of political disaffection, through
the medium of distressed and persecuted debtors.
In Grimball v. Ross,80 Judge Charlton sustained
Georgia's legislative enactment, of limited duration,
which declared that "neither of the aforesaid courts shall
issue out any civil process or try any civil case, except
for the trial of the right of property, real and personal."
He dismissed the argument on the contract clause by
stating:
This act therefore, as it does not innovate upon the obligation
of contracts, either by a partial rescindment, by destroying any
of the properties of contracts, or by diverting the usual opera-
tion of the lien, cannot be said to impair the obligation of con-
tracts. The usual periods at which contracts were heretofore en-
forced by action are protracted: the facilities of recovery have
been suspended. But does this impair the obligation of con-
tracts? Certainly not. Their obligation remains entire, and a
bond or covenant is as valuable, and on the score of obligation, is
as operative now, as before the passing of the act.
On the other hand, a North Carolina stay law passed
during the War of 1812 was held unconstitutional in
Crittenden v. Jones,"' where Chief Justice Taylor, quot-
ing extensively from the experience of South Carolina
with such laws during the period of the Confederation,
said:
The law in question is unconstitutional, and cannot be exe-
cuted by the judicial department without violating the para-
mount duty of their oaths to maintain the Constitution of the
United States.
This conclusion we derive, first. From the plain and natural
import of the words of the Constitution of the United States.
Second. From a consideration of the previously existing mis-
chiefs, which it was the design of that valuable instrument to
suppress and remedy.
80 Hall's American Law Journal, I, 93 (1809).
81 Hall's American Law Journal, V, 520 (1814).
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But, in Louisiana, there was sustained a stay of all
court processes for four months during the British inva-
sion of 1814-15, in Johnson v. Demean"' where the court
strongly stressed the purpose of the law to "prevent the
ill administration of justice." Similar to this case is that
of Newkirk v. Chapron,s3 where the Illinois Supreme
Court sustained a stay of forty-two days in which to
transfer to the circuit and superior courts the records of
the old Chicago Municipal Court, created in 1837 to help
take care of the many creditors rushing to the courts
to reduce their debts to judgment, when that court was
abolished in response to public protests.8 4 It was attacked
as impairing the obligation of contracts, but the court
said, "It is not true . . . that there must be, ever, and
continually in being, officially, a person, with power to
issue process, and to execute it."
Several provisions of the current moratory laws have
already been held unconstitutional by the state courts,
either as violative of the Federal Constitution or of some
peculiar provisions of the state constitutions. 5 But, on
some provisions the courts have as yet not spoken, and
on others their decisions have been reported only by
non-official sources.8 6 Most state decisions preceding
Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell tended to
hold the current legislation unconstitutional and relied
heavily on the precedents, already surveyed in this
article, in which similar legislative relief had failed.
However, it is but natural that the change of view of
the United States Supreme Court should have had reper-
cussions in the state decisions. For instance, the ultra-
conservative Michigan Supreme Court in Thompson v.
82 3 Mart. (0. S.) 530, 6 Am. Dec. 675 (La., 1815).
83 17 l. 344, 348-9 (1856).
84 See Carter, "The Early Courts of Cook County," 10 I11. L. Rev. 79, 85-86
(1915).
85 See Oklahoma ex rel. Osage County Say. & Loan Assn. v. Worten, 29
Pac. (2d) 1 (1933).
86 See Oklahoma ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield (Oklahoma Supreme Court), U. S.
Law Week, for October 24, 1933, at p. 8.
87 261 Mich. 624, 247 N. W. 360 (1933).
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Auditor General"7 gave an opinion which thoroughly sur-
veyed the historical background of the contract clause
and invalidated an indirect moratorium on tax sales. The
statute, which directed the auditor-general not to publish
descriptions of tax-delinquent properties in the news-
papers-a requisite condition of tax sale, was held to
impair the obligation of the contract with the newspaper
to print such descriptions. Although the language of the
court was absolutist in spirit, and the formal opinion
granted the issuing of the desired writ of mandamus, a
note of the reporter indicates that "under subsequent
order of court, the writ of mandamus was not issued, in
view of the existing emergency, and its being a discre-
tionary writ. ' 8 8 In a per curiam decision in Russell v.
Battle Creek Lumber Company,9 the court which had so
flayed the doctrine of emergency sustained the Michigan
emergency moratorium statute extending the periods of
redemption as controlled by the Blaisdell case.
Perhaps more striking than the Michigan cases is the
complete about-face of the New Jersey Court of Appeals.
In Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Company,90 a unanimous
bench held unconstitutional the substitution of the fair
market value of property, as determined in an action on
the mortgage bond, for the proceeds of a foreclosure sale
as the credit to be allowed the debtor. That was in
November of 1933. In February of 1934, the same court
in Lurie v. J. J. Hockenjos Company, 1 in a very short
discussion citing very few cases, affirmed an order direct-
ing the mortgagee, who purchased the mortgaged prem-
ises at the foreclosure sale for an unconscionable price
because of economic conditions, to credit the fair value
of the mortgaged premises on the deficiency claim, as a
condition of the prosecution of an action for-deficiency.
In other words, the New Jersey court first held the
statute unconstitutional and then sustained a judge in
88 247 N. W. 362.
89265 Mich. 649, 252 N. W. 561 (1934).
90 111 N. J. L. 596, 169 Ad. 177 (1933).
91 115 N. J. Eq. 304, 170 Ad. 593 (1934).
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doing substantially what the unconstitutional statute had
directed him to do!
The constitutionality of the various types of moratory
legislation will ultimately depend, as was stated before,
upon a nice weighing of the factors involved in the
changed relations of creditor and debtor; that is, have
they been altered in a reasonable exercise of the state's
police power? Such is the test laid down in the Blaisdell
case.
Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the mea-
sure of control which the State retains over remedial processes,
but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people . . . the reservation of essential at-
tributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a post-
ulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of government
by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while,-a gov-
ernment which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. ...
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise
of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding
interference with contracts. ...
And if state power exists to give temporary relief from the en-
forcement of contracts in the presence of disasters due to phys-
ical causes such as fire, flood, or earthquake, that power cannot
be said to be non-existent when the urgent public need demand-
ing such relief is produced by other and economic causes.92
Obviously, the "public need," of which the Chief
Justice spoke, includes not merely the debtor; it must
also include the creditor. In being fair and just to the
debtor, the legislation must not operate unfairly and
unjustly on the creditor. One of the essential conditions
of fairness, to which such legislation should be subjected,
is that the creditor be compensated during the period of
extended redemption. It has been estimated, for example,
92 54 S. Ct. 238-39, 240-41.
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that if the statute extends the redemption period for one
year during which the mortgagor is allowed to retain
possession,
it will cost the mortgagee at least 10 percent of the sum loaned,
plus any intervening depreciation of the property. If redemp-
tion is ultimately made he gets his money back, but redemptions
have been very scarce, in western states, these last ten years.
What the new time really means is a new option in the mort-
gagor, plus a new year's possession, at the mortgagee's expense.
93
It was probably the absence of a provision for compensa-
tion that led the North Dakota Supreme Court to invali-
date its moratorium law in State ex rel. Cleveringa v.
Klein.94 Such a provision is also notably lacking in the
Kansas and South Dakota laws, 5 whose consequent
validity may be seriously questioned. On the other hand,
the New York" and Texas 97 laws, which have been sus-
tained, secure to the mortgagee the fair rental value of
the property for the purpose of taking care of taxes,
insurance, and possible interest payments. Statutes
phrased in terms of the traditional powers of chancery
courts and vesting the trial court with discretionary
power of administrating relief9" have good chances of
93 Bunn, "The Impairment of Contracts: Mortgage and Insurance Moratoria,"
1 U. of Chicago Law Rev., 249, 252 (1933).
9463 N. D. 514, 249 N. W. 118 (1933).
95 Kansas (c. 232) and South Dakota (c. 137).
96See Sherwin v. Jonas, 267 N. Y. S. 759 (1933), and McCarty v. Prudence
Bonds Corp., 266 N. Y. S. 629 (1933).
97See Lingo Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 64 S. W. (2d) 835 (Dallas, Oct., 1933);
Beaumont Petroleum Syndicate v. Broussard, 64 S. W. (2d) 993 (Beaumont,
Nov., 1933); and Anthony v. North American Bldg. & Loan Assn., 68 S. W.
(2d) 581 (Dallas, Jan., 1934) holding the moratorium law constitutional.
But cf. Virginia Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 62 S. W. (2d) 348 (El Paso, July,
1933) and Murphy v. Phillips, 63 S. W. (2d) 404 (San Antonio, Oct., 1933)
holding the same law unconstitutional. These are all decisions by coordinate
branches of the Texas Civil Court of Appeals; so the matter has not been
definitely settled by the state courts. If one dares to predict, it should be in
favor of its constitutionality.
98 Compare the Wisconsin mediation board (c. 15). For decisions independ-
ently of statutes see Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N. W. 556 (Wis. 1933),
where chancery court fixed upset price; and Lurie v. Hockenjos Co., 170 Atl.
593 (N. J. 1934).
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survival." A total abolition of deficiency judgments, on
the other hand, is very hard to justify, for that seems to
change the essential nature of the mortgage indebted-
ness. 1°0 All of the decisions sustaining moratoria have
laid heavy weight on the temporary character of the
legislation; it must have a limited duration. 101 And with-
out question, statutes limited in their application to
mortgages on farms and homes, and perhaps property
used in one's business, have better claims to the "vital
interests," of which the Chief Justice spoke, than stat-
utes without any such limitation.0 2
It is believed that the ultimate significance of Home
Building amd Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell lies not in the mere
upholding of a temporary state statute in relief of hard-
pressed debtors, but in the fundamentally different type
of approach to the discussion and solution of constitu-
tional problems. The older type of approach was perhaps
well illustrated by Justice Sutherland's comment that
"If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when
they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well
be abandoned. "'I for to him moratory legislation was
the very thing historically prohibited by the contract
clause. One of the canons of constitutional interpretations
seems to have been that when the history was clear, the
interpretation of the Constitution should be governed by
its history. If not, what seems the value of constitutional
limitations on the powers of government? Dissents from
this orthodox point of view have been evidenced in state
9 9
Kansas (c. 218) as "declaratory of equity powers now existent;" New
Hampshire (c. 161); Vermont (no. 30, §3) ; and Wisconsin (c. 15).
100 See Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S. W. (2d) 686, holding such
a provision unconstitutional.
101 See Sliosberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 244 N. Y. 482, 155 N. E. 749 (1927)
where a law staying actions growing out of insurance contracts payable in
Russian roubles until 30 days after recognition de jure was held unconstitu-
tional as too indefinite. But note that Charles Hughes, as counsel, argued its
constitutionality.
The Nebraska (c. 41) and Texas (c. 92) deficiency judgments relief statutes
have no such time limitation. Query, as to validity on this count.
102 California (c. 30), Illinois (649-50), Minnesota (c. 339), North Dakota
(c. 99), Pennsylvania (no. 137), and Wisconsin (c. 11).
'On 54 S. Ct. 256.
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decisions. 104 But in the Blaisdell case we find the Su-
preme Court of the United States speaking through a
5-to-4 majority about
• . . a growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity
of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual
rights and public welfare. The settlement and consequent con-
traction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly in-
creasing density of population, the interrelation of the activities
of our people and the complexity of our economic interests, have
inevitably led to an increased use of the organization of society
in order to protect the very bases of individual opportunity.
Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the concerns
of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of
the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been
found that the fundamental interests of the State are directly
affected; and that the question is no longer merely that of one
party to a contract as against another, but of the use of reason-
able means to safeguard the economic structure upon which the
good of all depends.
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104 "When an eighteenth century constitution forms the charter of liberty
of a twentieth century government, must its general provisions be construed
and interpreted by an eighteenth century mind in the light of eighteenth cen-
tury conditions and ideals? Clearly not. This were to command the race to
halt in its progress, to stretch the state upon a veritable bed of Procrustes.
"Where there is no express command or prohibition, but only general lan-
guage or policy to be considered, the conditions prevailing at the time of its
adoption must have their due weight; but the changed social, economic, and
governmental conditions and ideals of the time, as well as the problems which
the changes have produced, must also logically enter into the consideration,
and become influential factors in the settlement of problems of construction
and interpretation." Per Winslow, C. J., upholding workmen's compensation
act embodying "elective" insurance plan, in Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327,
350, 133 N. W. 209, 216 (1911).
L05 54 S. Ct. 241. Cf. Nebbia v. People of the State of New York, 78 L. Ed.
563, 54 S. Ct. 505, 510-11, 514, 516-17 (1934) where, in sustaining the New York
Milk Control Act, Mr. Justice Roberts said: "These correlative rights, that of
the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over property and freely to contract
about his affairs, and that of the state to regulate the use of property and the
conduct of business, are always in collision. No exercise of the private right
can be imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the
public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the
citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property.
But subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the
public need.
"The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth,
as respects State action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public
welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by secur-
ing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process.
And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
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Justice Hughes concluded his opinion with a complete
refutation of the historical approach to the settlement
of constitutional problems when such an interpretation
runs counter to the "public needs":
Nor is it helpful to attempt to draw a fine distinction between
the intended meaning of the words of the Constitution and their
intended application. When we consider the contract clause and
the decisions which have expounded it in harmony with the es-
sential reserved power of the States to protect the security of
their peoples, we find no warrant for the conclusion that the
clause has been warped by these decisions from its proper sig-
nificance or that the founders of our Government would have in-
terpreted the clause differently had they had occasion to assume
that responsibility in the conditions of the later day. The vast
body of law which has been developed was unknown to the fathers
but it is believed to have preserved the essential content and the
spirit of the Constitution. With a growing recognition of pub-
lic needs and the relation of individual right to public security,
the court has sought to prevent the perversion of the clause
through its use as an instrument to throttle the capacity of the
States to protect their fundamental interests. 0
With this decision, it has been definitely determined
that the contract prohibition is no longer absolute in
effect; its exercise has been made subject to the police
power of the state which is limited only by the "force of
reason" in the light of contemporary circumstances.
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
attained. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given
circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under
other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends
upon the relative facts....
"The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something
peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or
sells; and that, however able to regulate other elements of manufacture or
trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly con-
trolling the price itself. This view was hegatived many years ago. ...
"The Constitution does not secure to any one liberty to conduct his business
in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or upon any sub-
stantial group of the people. Price control, like any other form of regulation,
is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant
to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and hence an unnecessary and
unwarranted interference with individual liberty."
106 54 S. Ct. 242.
